Logic

“But in fact, they don't even know what thinking is. Because thinking is not actually logic. That was the mistake that the Greeks made. And that was the mistake that St Thomas Aquinas made. It was the major mistake of the Middle Ages. It was also the major mistake of Postmodernism. That isn't what it is.” —Alan Kay

What is Logic?

Logic is the study of reasoning. It deals primarily with inference, but also entailment, causality, consequence, induction, deduction, truth, falsity, belief, fallacies, paradoxes, probabilities, analysis, tense, modality, necessity, sufficiency, possibility, identity, vagueness, existence, description, justification, tolerance, obligation, permission, relevance, assertion, validity, contradiction, provability, and argumentation.

One of the central questions explored in the study of logic is:

Does the conclusion follow from the premises?

The phrase “follow from” can have different interpretations, including, but not limited to:

Deduction
There is no possible situation in which the all of the premises are true but the conclusion is false.
Induction
The premises give really strong evidence for the truth of the conclusion.

A Pretest

Have some fun! Take this logic pre-test.

Notation

In order to understand the form of arguments and not get bogged down in long, confusing, and often ambiguous text, we usually write statements in a very compact form. We often use common abbreviations such as the following:

FormMeaningTechnical Term
$T$TrueTruth
$F$FalseFalsity
$\neg A$Not $A$Negation
$A \wedge B$$A$ and $B$Conjunction
$A \vee B$$A$ or $B$, or bothDisjunction
$A \supset B$It is not the case that $A$ is true and $B$ is false
(i.e., whenever $A$ is true, $B$ is true)
Material Implication
$A \equiv B$$A$ and $B$ are either both true or both falseMaterial Equivalence
$A \rightarrow B$If $A$, then $B$
(non-truth-functional)
Conditional
$\forall x. A$For every $x$, $A$Universal quantification
$\exists x. A$There exists an $x$ such that $A$Existential quantification
$\iota x. A$The $x$ such that $A$Description
$x = y$$x$ and $y$ are the same objectEquality
$\Box A$In all possible worlds, $A$Necessity
$\lozenge A$In some possible world, $A$Possibility
$\mathbf{P} A$It was (at least once) the case that $A$Past
$\mathbf{F} A$It will (at least at some point) be the case that $A$Future
$\mathbf{H} A$It was always the case that $A$Always has been
$\mathbf{G} A$It will forever be the case that $A$Always going to be
$\mathscr{O} A$$A$ must (morally) be doneObligation
$\mathscr{P} A$$A$ may (morally) be donePermission
$\mathscr{K}_x A$Agent $x$ knows $A$Knowledge
$\mathscr{B}_x A$Agent $x$ believes $A$Belief
$|A|$Truth value of $A$ (in 0.0 ... 1.0)Numerical Truth Value
$pr(A)$Probability of $A$ being trueProbability
$pr(A|B)$Probability of $A$ being true given that $B$ is trueConditional Probability
$E(\sigma)$The expected value of doing $\sigma$Expectation

It takes quite a bit of practice to translate English (or other natural language) sentences into logical notation. In fact, the translation might not always be exact; natural language is pretty fluid (see, for example, The SEP article on Conditionals for the many readings of “if...then”). We’ll just give examples, rather than rules.

EngilshLogicBreakdown
Juliet is Italian$\mathit{Italian(Juliet)}$
$Ij$
Romeo likes Juliet$\mathit{Likes(Romeo,Juliet)}$
$Lrj$
Romeo likes himself$Lrr$
Romeo likes Romeo
Romeo likes the King’s daughter$Lr(\iota x.Dkx)$
Romeo likes the person x such that the daughter of the king is x
All apples are fruits$\forall x.(Ax \supset Fx)$
For every x if x is an apple x is a fruit
Some apples are green$\exists x.(Ax \wedge Gx)$
There exists an x such that x is an apple AND x is green
All snakes are animals$\forall x.(Sx \supset Ax)$
For every thing x if x is a snake x is an animal
$\neg \exists x.(Sx \wedge \neg Ax)$
It is NOT the case that there exists an x such that x is a snake AND x is not an animal
Some snakes are poisonous$\exists x.(Sx \wedge Px)$
There exists an x such that x is a snake AND x is poisonous
$\neg \forall x.(Sx \supset \neg Px)$
It is NOT the case that for every x if x is a snake then x is non-poisonous
Alice sees everybody$\forall p. Sap$
For every (person) p Alice sees p
$\neg \exists p.\neg Sap$
It is NOT the case that there exists a (person) p such that Alice does not see p
Alice sees somebody$\exists p.Sap$
There exists a (person) p such that Alice sees p
$\neg \forall p. \neg Sap$
It is NOT the case that for every (person) p Alice does not see p
Alice sees nobody$\neg \exists p.Sap$
It is NOT the case that there exists a (person) p such that Alice sees p
$\forall p. \neg Sap$
For every (person) p it is NOT the case that Alice sees p
Juliet doesn’t like French people$ \neg\exists p.(Fp \wedge Ljp)$
It is NOT the case that there exists a (person) p such that p is French AND Juliet likes p
$\forall p.(Fp \supset \neg Ljp)$
For every (person) p if p is French It is NOT the case that Juliet likes p
Juliet likes all Italians$\forall p.(Ip \supset Ljp)$
For every (person) p if p is Italian Juliet likes p
Juliet likes all Italians except Romeo$\forall p.(Ip \supset (Ljp \equiv \neg (p=r)))$
For every (person) p if p is Italian Juliet likes p IF AND ONLY IF p is not Romeo
Every Italian likes someone$\forall p. (Ip \supset \exists q.Lpq)$
For every (person) p if p is Italian there exists (a person) q such that p likes q
Everyone likes an Italian$\forall p. \exists q.(Iq \wedge Lpq)$
For every (person) p there exists some q such that q is Italian AND p likes q
Everyone likes this one particular Italian$\exists q.(Iq \wedge \forall p.Lpq)$
There exists a particular q such that q is Italian AND for every (person) p p likes this one particular q
Pablo shaves all and only those who do not shave themselves$\forall q.(Spq \equiv \neg Sqq)$
For every (person) q Pablo shaves q IF AND ONLY IF it is not that case that q shaves q
Not everyone is libertarian or progressive$\neg \forall p.(Lp \vee Pp)$
It is NOT the case that there exists a (person) p such that p is Libertarian OR p is progressive
$\exists p.(\neg Lp \wedge \neg Pp)$
There exists a (person) p such that p is NOT libertarian AND p is NOT progressive
Either the queen is rich or some pigs fly$Rq \vee \exists p.(Pp \wedge Fp)$
The queen is rich OR there exists a p such that p is a pig AND p flies
Everything has a cause$\forall x. \exists y.Cyx$
For every (thing) x there exists some y such that y caused x
Everything has the same cause$\exists y. \forall x.Cyx$
There exists this one (uber thing) y such that for every thing x y caused x
Nothing caused itself$\forall x. \neg Cxx$
For every (thing) x it is NOT the case that x caused x
$\neg \exists x. Cxx$
It is NOT the case that there exists an x such that x caused x
Everybody loves somebody, but someone is unloved$(\forall x. \exists y.Lxy) \wedge (\exists x.\neg \exists y.Lyx)$
For every (person) x there is some (person) y such that x loves y AND ALSO there exists some (person) x such that it is NOT the case that there exists some (person) y such that y loves x
Some number less than 5 is a perfect square$\exists x. (x<5 \wedge \exists y.(x=y^2))$
There exists an x such that x < 5 AND the exists a y such that x is y squared
Juliet might like Romeo$\lozenge Ljr$
It is possible that Juliet likes Romeo
Two is necessarily equal to two$\Box (2=2)$
It is necessary that 2 equals 2
The Olympic thunder-god was worshiped by some Athenians$\exists p.(Ap \wedge Wp(\iota g.Gtg))$
There exists a (person) p such that p is an Athenian AND p worships the g such that the god of thunder is g
It is possible that at some point, the sun-god became forever awesome$\lozenge \mathbf{FG}A(\iota g.Gsg)$
It is possible that at some point in the future it will always be the case that the g such that the god of sun is g is awesome
Juliet believes that Romeo doesn’t believe that Juliet likes him $\mathscr{B}_j(\neg \mathscr{B}_r Ljr)$
Juliet believes that it is not the case that Romeo believes that Juliet likes Romeo

We were pretty liberal with parentheses, but you don’t have to be. $\neg$ has the highest precedence, then $\wedge$, then $\vee$ then $\supset$ then $\equiv$.

A logical argument is written as a sequence of formulas. We check the validity of the argument by checking whether each formula is either (1) a premise or (2) follows from previous formulas. Arguments can also be given graphically, with premises above the line and conclusions below. Example:

$q$ 
$q \vee p$$\neg q$
$p$

The meaning of “follows from” depends on the particular system of logic you are working under.

So let’s look at different kinds of logic.

Kinds of Logic

How can there be many different kinds of logic? Well, for one there could be different ways to understand “truth.” Sometimes we aren’t concerned with exact truth, but rather “degree of belief,” or whether something is “justified,” or “achievable,” or “knowable.”

Here are some types of logics. The list is incomplete. The types are also overlapping.

Bivalent Logic

A bivalent system has exactly two truth values, usually called true and false. What kinds of systems are not bivalent? Those with a third value (sometimes called “unknown”), and those where a truth value is represented as a degree of certainty or belief (e.g. a value ∈ 0.0..1.0).

Propositional Logic

Propositional Logic deals only with atomic sentences, known as prepositions, such as “Pigs fly”, “I am late”, “The moon is square”, and “The baby wants to sleep”. By “atomic” we mean variables can only refer to complete sentences, never to the actors or the actions within the sentences. In other words, prepositions are never decomposed. Sentences can be combined with truth operators to form larger sentences. The traditional operators are:

FormMeaning
$p \wedge q$$p$ and $q$
$p \vee q$$p$ or $q$ (or both)
$\neg p$not $p$
$p \supset q$$p$ materially implies $q$; e.g., $\neg(p \wedge \neg q)$, or equivalently, $\neg p \vee q$
$p \equiv q$$p$ and $q$ have the same truth value
Example: Let $p$ = “Pigs fly”, $q$ = “The queen is rich”. Then
$p \wedge q$ means “Pigs fly and the queen is rich”
$\neg q \vee p$ means “The queen is not rich or pigs fly”
$(p \vee q) \wedge (\neg p \wedge \neg q)$ means “Pigs fly or the queen is rich, but not both”

Note: The $\wedge$ and $\vee$ operators are meant to be material, not causal. They cannot distinguish the sentence “I called her and found out about the problem” from “I found out about the problem and called her.”

Exercise: The requirement that propositions be atomic, without any unspecified “variables” within, cannot be stressed strongly enough. Read this 1908 letter by Bertrand Russell (H/T Alissa Crans for the link) where he describes the difference between propositions and non-atomic things he calls statements.

Syllogistic Logic

Systems of logic featuring syllogisms were studied thousands of years ago; they include reasoning about “all” and “some”, but do not allow general propositions nor connectives like “and” and “or”. Traditionally, only the following eight kinds of statements are considered (capital letters are classes, small letters are instances):

FormExample
$x$ is $A$Socrates is human
$x$ is not $A$Fido is not human
$x$ is $y$Obama is the 44th U.S. President
$x$ is not $y$Italy is not the 2016 Olympic champion in Women’s Water Polo
All $A$ are $B$All dogs are mammals
No $A$ is $B$No dogs are fish
Some $A$ are $B$Some birds are flyers
Some $A$ are not $B$Some markers are not green

Syllogistic logic has been completely superseded by first-order predicate logic.

Exercise: Read this classic article by John Venn, of Venn Diagram fame regarding the shortcomings of syllogisms and how the new-way of doing logic came to be in the late 1800s. What was Venn trying to capture with his new notation that syllogisms simply could not capture?
Exercise: Those diagrams that Venn introduced in that article in the previous exercise...they look...familiar, don’t they? What do we call those things today?

Predicate Logic

A predicate logic adds objects, functions on objects, predicates, descriptions, and quantifiers (such as $\exists$ and $\forall$) to propositional logic. A first-order logic allows quantification over objects only; In a second-order logic you can quantify over first-order predicates. You can go on forever with these orders.

Classical Logic

Classical Logic is probably the most widely used logic. It is characterized by five properties (so say one of the authors of the Wikipedia article on the subject):

The term “classical” here does mean old or ancient. This was not the logic of the Ancient Greeks, the Ancient Chinese, or the Ancient anyone else. Classical Logic dates from the late 1800s. It’s relatively new.

Intuitionistic (Constructive) Logic

In intuitionistic logic we are not concerned with the truth of a statement as much as we are about its justification. Every theorem is something justifiable, constructively. So $A$ means “$A$ is provable” and $\neg A$ means “$A$ is refutable” (i.e., it is provable that no proof of $A$ exists—in other words, assuming A allows you to derive False). Therefore:

Relevance Logic

Classical logic has the principle of explosion: false implies everything. Or in other words, “from a contradiction, everything follows.” The rationale is: if things are only true or false, and you assume false is true, then everything is true because true is already true and now you say that false is true also.

Let’s demonstrate with a proof of $(A \wedge \neg A) \supset B$:

1. $A$Assumption
2. $\neg A$Assumption
3. $A \vee B$Disj Intro (1)
4. $B$Conj Elim (2, 3)

This means the following statements are true in classical logic:

Exercise: Ugh. That last one looks awful. See if the Wikipedia article on Vacuous Truth helps make sense of it. If not, go discuss it with a mathematician or logician.

Relevance logic rejects explosion, and requires the antecedent and consequent to be related to each other. There must be some real causality. We say in classical logic, implication is material but in relevance logic it is strict. There are many different ways to encode relevance.

Read about Relevance Logic in the SEP.

Exercise: Write a research paper on relevance logics.

Free Logic

Descriptions can be tricky. What if no object satisfies the description?

Russell regarded $P(\iota x.Ax)$ as an abbreviation for $\exists x.((\forall y.(Ay \equiv y=x)) \wedge Px)$. But this means the statement is false unless there is a unique object satisfying the description $A$ and that has the property $P$.

A free logic allows the description of terms that do not denote anything. Read about Free Logic in the SEP.

Non-monotonic Logic

A non-monotonic logic rejects the monotonicity of entailment. If a logic is monotonic, then adding new information can change the set of known facts, causing previously known truths to become falsehoods. These kind of logics are good for cases where you have to retract previous knowledge when new facts are known, as in

See the SEP article on non-monotonic logic.

Paraconsistent Logic

A paraconsistent logic is one that allows contradictions, by throwing out the principle of explosion.

See the SEP article on Paraconsistent Logic.

Many-Valued Logics

A many-valued logic has, you got it, many truth-values. Many such systems exist. What’s useful about them is they get rid of the those principles of excluded middle and non-contradiction.

You might be interested in four-valued logics.

Catuṣkoṭi

The Catuṣkoṭi is also known as the “Four Corners.” Propositions take on four values :

Find out more at Wikpedia and the SEP and this lecture by Graham Priest.

Fuzzy Logic

A fuzzy logic is one in which facts have a degree of truth between 0 and 1. It is useful for statements like “$X$ is tall” or “$X$ is an adult” or “The bike is new.”

Do not confuse fuzzy logic with paraconsistent logic.

Do not confuse fuzzy logic with probability theory.

Read about Fuzzy Logic in the SEP.

Modal Logic

Modal Logic deals with modalities, which qualify statements somehow. There are many different kinds of modalities, giving rise to different kinds of logics. Each can be based on classical or non-classical logics, and use numeric truth values, too.

See the SEP article on modal logic.

Alethic Logic (Necessity and Possibility)

The basic alethic modal operators are defined as:

FormMeaning
$\Box A$It is necessary that A
$\lozenge A$It is possible that A

In classical modal logic, the two operators are duals:

$$\begin{eqnarray} \Box A & \equiv & \neg \lozenge \neg A \\ \lozenge A & \equiv & \neg \Box \neg A \\ \neg \Box A & \equiv & \lozenge \neg A \\ \neg \lozenge A & \equiv & \Box \neg A \\ \end{eqnarray}$$

Various systems of modal logic are characterized by the axioms and inference rules they add to the underlying logic.

Exercise: Do you think from $\Box A$ you should be allowed to infer $\lozenge A$? Why or why not?

Deontic Logic (Obligation and Permission)

The basic deontic operators are defined as:

FormMeaning
$\mathscr{O}A$It is obligatory that $A$, or $A$ ought to be (MUST)
$\mathscr{P}A$It is permissible that $A$, or $A$ is allowed (MAY)
Exercise: Are these operators duals? Why or why not?
Exercise: Which of the following do you think should be valid in deontic logic: (a) From $\mathscr{O}A$ infer $\mathscr{P}A$, (b) From $\mathscr{O}A$ infer $A$, (c) $\mathscr{O}(\mathscr{O}A \supset A)$.

Epistemic Logic (Knowledge)

In epistemic logic we have:

FormMeaning
$\mathscr{K}_x A$Agent x knows A
$\mathscr{K} A$A is known (by some agent whose identity we assume from context)
Exercise: Show how the English word “must” can be used in both deontic and epistemic modalities.

Doxastic Logic (Belief)

In doxastic logic we have:

FormMeaning
$\mathscr{B}_x A$Agent x believes A
$\mathscr{B} A$A is believed (by some agent whose identity we assume from context)

You may sometimes see the epistemic and the doxastic distinguished in the following context. Let $\Gamma = \exists g. G g$, i.e. there exists a $g$ such that $g$ is a god, or “(at least one) god exists.” Then:

Exercise: What is the difference between $\neg \mathscr{B}_x\,\Gamma$ and $\mathscr{B}_x\,\neg \Gamma$. Explain what each is saying in English. Would most English speakers be able to tell the difference? Is one statement ”stronger” than the other?

Temporal Logic

Temporal logic deals with the modalities of time.

FormMeaning
$\mathbf{P}A$$A$ was true (at some point) in the Past
$\mathbf{F}A$$A$ will be true (at some point) in the Future
$\mathbf{H}A$$A$ Has always been true
$\mathbf{G}A$$A$ is always Going to be true

Dynamic Logic

Dynamic Logic brings events into the picture:

FormMeaning
$[e]A$“After event $e$, $A$ is necessarily true”
$\langle e \rangle A$“After event e, A is possibly true”
Exercise: In what sense to the formulas above equate with events “causing” things to be true or not?
Temporal vs. Dynamic Logic

Temporal logic [is] the modal logic of choice for reasoning about concurrent systems with its aspects of synchronization, interference, independence, deadlock, livelock, fairness, etc. These concerns of concurrency would appear to be less central to linguistics, philosophy, and artificial intelligence, the areas in which dynamic logic is most often encountered nowadays. — Wikipedia

Formal Logic

In logic we are not so much concerned with the absolute truth or falsity of individual premises themselves, but rather with the form of arguments. We can make this idea precise with formal systems.

A Formal System is a mechanism for symbolically generating a set of formulas (called theorems) via inference rules.

A logistic system (a.k.a. a system of formal logic) is a formal system in which formulas are assigned truth values.

We need examples.

Syntax

So first, what is a formula? It’s a statement, written as a string of symbols from a finite alphabet, that is formed according to formation rules which we call a grammar. The grammar defines the syntax of the formal system.

For example, here is a grammar for classical propositional logic:

var      → "p" | "q" | "r" | var "′"
formula  → "T" | "F" | var
         | "¬" formula
         | "(" formula "∧" formula ")"
         | "(" formula "∨" formula ")"
         | "(" formula "⊃" formula ")"
         | "(" formula "≡" formula ")"

which means that

    p
    (¬(p′′′ ∧ q) ∨ ¬¬p)
    (r ⊃ p′)

are formulas, but

    ¬≡pp∧))′∧¬q∨(F′′

is not. Neither, by the way is p ∧ q, since the syntax above requires parentheses around all formulae formed with binary operators. Look again, closely!

Semantics

The semantics is given by a defining a function that maps each formula to a truth value. The mapping is necessarily relative to some interpretation (or situation) φ which gives meanings to the variables in the system.

For example, the semantics of classical propositional logic is defined as follows:

$\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{Interpretation} = \mathtt{var} \rightarrow \mathbb{B} \\ \\ \mathscr{E} : \mathtt{formula} \rightarrow \mathsf{Interpretation} \rightarrow \mathbb{B} \\ \\ \mathscr{E}〚T〛\phi = T \\ \mathscr{E}〚F〛\phi = F \\ \mathscr{E}〚p〛\phi = \phi(p) \\ \mathscr{E}〚\neg A〛 \phi = T\textrm{, if }\mathscr{E} A \phi = F\textrm{, else }F \\ \mathscr{E}〚(A ∧ B)〛\phi = T\textrm{, if }\mathscr{E} A \phi = T\textrm{ and }\mathscr{E} B \phi = T\textrm{, else }F \\ \mathscr{E}〚(A ∨ B)〛\phi = F\textrm{, if }\mathscr{E} A \phi = F\textrm{ and }\mathscr{E} B \phi = F\textrm{, else }T \\ \mathscr{E}〚(A ⊃ B)〛\phi = F\textrm{, if }\mathscr{E} A \phi = T\textrm{ and }\mathscr{E} B \phi = F\textrm{, else }T \\ \mathscr{E}〚(A ≡ B)〛\phi = T\textrm{, if }\mathscr{E} A \phi = \mathscr{E} B \phi\textrm{, else }F \\ \end{array}$
Exercise: Given the semantics of classical propositional logic, evaluate the meaning of:

$(\neg p \wedge (r \supset \neg q)) \vee p)$

under an interpretation in which $p$ is mapped to true, $q$ to false, and $r$ to true.

We’re interested ultimately in valid reasoning—what follows from what—so let’s define some terms:

Satisfiability
If formula $A$ is true under some interpretation $\varphi$ we write $\vDash_{\varphi}A$ and say $\varphi$ satisfies $A$, or that $A$ is satisfiable.
Validity
If formula $A$ is true under all interpretations we write $\vDash A$ and say A is a tautology, or that $A$ is valid.
Entailment
If formula $A$ is true under all interpretations in which formula $B$ is true, we write $B \vDash A$ and say $B$ entails $A$. Entailment is central to reasoning; if our knowledge base contains $B$ and we know that $B$ entails $A$, we know, then, that $A$ is true.

validandsatisfiable.png

Exercise: Prove the following:
  • If a formula is valid, then it is satisfiable
  • If a formula is unsatisfiable, then it is invalid
  • In classical propositional logic, $A$ is valid iff $\neg A$ is unsatisifiable
  • In classical propositional logic, $A$ is invalid iff $\neg A$ is satisifiable

Inference Rules

In a logistic system, we don’t necessarily compute semantic functions for the fun of it. Instead, we apply inference rules to algorithmically, (or mechanistically, typographically, symbolically) generate a formulas in such a way as to mimic a reasoning process. Define

$\{A_1, ..., A_n\} \vdash B$

to mean “$B$ given assumptions $A_1, ..., A_n$.” The inference rules of a logistic system produce these kinds of statements.

Example: The inference rules of classical propositional logic are these:

If $\varnothing \vdash A$, we say $A$ is a theorem and write $\vdash A$. The sequence of inferences producing a theorem is a proof of that theorem.

Example: The following is a proof of the theorem ((p ∧ (p ⊃ q)) ⊃ (p ∧ q))
1. (p ∧ (p ⊃ q)) ⊢ (p ∧ (p ⊃ q))Assumption
2. (p ∧ (p ⊃ q)) ⊢ pConj Elim (1)
3. (p ∧ (p ⊃ q)) ⊢ (p ⊃ q)Conj Elim (1)
4. (p ∧ (p ⊃ q)) ⊢ qMP (2, 3)
5. (p ∧ (p ⊃ q)) ⊢ (p ∧ q)Conj Intro (2, 4)
6. ((p ∧ (p ⊃ q)) ⊃ (p ∧ q))Impl Intro (5)
Exercise: Give proofs of the following theorems:
  • $\neg F$
  • $(p \supset (q \supset p))$
  • $(p \vee \neg p)$
  • $((p \supset q) \equiv (\neg p \vee q))$
  • $((p \equiv q) \supset ((p \wedge q) \vee (\neg p \wedge \neg q)))$
  • $((p \wedge \neg p) \supset q)$
  • $((p \vee (q \wedge r)) \supset (p \vee q))$

Properties of Logistic Systems

The definition of truth in a system is generally just stated in precise natural language, or with semantic functions (as in our example above). The derivation of theorems, however, is a purely mechanical process. We would like to know how well, in a logistic system, theorem derivation (proof) correlates with truth.

Soundness
A system is sound iff every theorem is true.
Completeness
A system is complete iff every true formula is a theorem.
Consistency
A system is consistent iff no two theorems have contradictory truth values (where “contradictory” depends on the type of logic being considered).
Decidability
A system is decidable iff there exists an (always-terminating) algorithm to determine whether or not a given formula is a theorem.
Exercise: What are the ramifications of a logistic system that is unsound? That is incomplete? That is inconsistent? That is undecidable?
Exercise: Show that, in a bivalent, classical logic, the following definition of consistency is in line with the general definition above: “A bivalent, classical logic is consistent iff there exists a formula that is not a theorem.” Also comment on the usefulness of a system in which everything you could possibly utter were a theorem.
Exercise: Suppose that you had a classical, bivalent logistic system powerful enough to express statements about the provability of its own formulas, for example, “This formula is not provable” or equivalently “I am not provable.” Show that such a system, if consistent, must be incomplete, and if complete, must be inconsistent.

The reasoning about logistic systems themselves is called metalogic.

Summary

We’ve covered:

  • What logic is concerned with
  • Common logic symbols
  • Many kinds of logics
  • Formal Logic
  • Axioms, Theorems, and Inference Rules
  • Metalogic (soundness, consistency, completeness, decidability)